Behind The Wins

The University of Iowa's loss to Northwestern last Saturday that put their win-loss record at 9-1 was the best thing that could happen to college football this year. Before the loss, the Iowa Hawkeyes were the media's darling for this season, unworthily reaching #4 in the BCS rankings. There was even talk from various pundits that they were worthy of going to the national championship title game if they continued to go undefeated. These sentiments came despite the fact the Hawkeyes were obviously struggling week in and week out to defeat even mediocre opponents and even the Iowa head coach, Kirk Ferentz, admitted his team was deeply flawed.

How right he was. The truth is that not only are the 2009 edition of the Hawkeyes not dominant enough in their games to be mentioned among the truly elite of college football, this team is not even as good as the Hawkeyes from last year who went 6-4 in their first ten games. What difference there is between the two squads in their win-loss records is largely a result of luck. Last year, the Hawkeyes were 1-4 in their games decided by 7 points or fewer; this season, they have been 4-1 in those games. Due to their improvement in the ability to win close contests, one could not be blamed for thinking the Hawkeyes had improved overall as a team. However, they have not.

On offense, the two squads are largely identical except when it comes to running the ball. The Hawkeyes were considerably better last year running the ball, averaging 4.7 yards per carry in their first ten games, substantially better than the 3.4 yards per carry of this season. This should come as no surprise since the Hawkeyes lost their leading rusher of last year, Shonn Greene, to the NFL along with losing Jewel Hampton for the season due to injury. Passing-wise, the offensive numbers are largely identical. While the completion percentage favors the 2008 squad (58.8% to 53.9%) and the yards per catch favor the 2009 team (14.0 to 12.5), the yards per attempt favor neither (7.4 in 2008 to 7.5 in 2009), indicating that the Hawkeye quarterbacks are going downfield more often this year than last for lower-percentage, higher-reward completions. With such a downturn in their rushing offense, the 2009 Hawkeyes are averaging 4.5 fewer points a game than in 2008.

The Hawkeyes on defense across the two seasons have been more of the same. Against opponents' quarterbacks, the pass defense has been a little more stingy this season, allowing a completion percentage of 50.8% and 5.5 yards per pass attempt contrasted with opposing quarterbacks completing 54.1% of their passes for 5.8 yards per pass attempt in 2008. The 2009 Hawkeyes are also slightly better at creating turnovers; through ten games, the Hawkeyes have a turnover margin of +5. Last year, in the same time frame, the 2008 Hawkeyes had a turnover margin of +3. Yet, the advantages the 2009 Hawkeye defense holds over the 2008 version has not translated into lower scores for their opponents. The 2008 Hawkeyes held their opponents to 1.7 fewer points per game (14.2 to 15.9).

Lastly, there is the matter of point differential. More accurate than win-loss records, point differential really indicates how good a team is because the win-loss record does not differentiate between a one-point win or a twenty-five point blowout. The higher a team's point differential, the more dominant that team is and usually, the better that team will play in the future. Since that is the case, it is hard to fathom why the 2009 Hawkeyes are seen as such an improvement over the 2008 team when you factor in that in 2008, Iowa outscored their opponents by 144 points through ten games while this season the Hawkeyes have only outscored their foes by 82 points. Everything which can be considered, outside of a misleading win-loss record, points to the Hawkeyes being largely the same team this season that they were the last one.

All sport aficianados, pollsters especially, should recognize the fact that not all wins are created equal and behind the wins, there can often be another reality entirely as there is with the Iowa Hawkeyes. Armed with the entire repertoire of knowledge about the two teams, it should be obvious to all that Kirk Ferentz should not be praised for being one of the top coaches in college football. As I wrote two years ago, conclusions I have yet to be forced to adjust, Kirk Ferentz largely fields mediocre teams that have one lucky season every three or four years. The 2009 season just happens to be one of his lucky ones.

Pulling Back The Curtain

The time has again come for me to expose another NFL player as a charlatan and illusionist and disabuse people of their fallacious notions about him. By now, even casual observers of the NFL know that Indianapolis Colts safety Bob Sanders has extreme durability issues. The knowledge is so widespread that when news came down that Sanders was once again out with a season-ending injury, the reaction was extremely pedestrian. Only the nature of the injury was a surprise; the fact he injured himself was inevitable. Yet, even though it is widely acknowledged Sanders cannot be counted on for an entire season, there are those who still think that when he does play, he is one of the top safeties in the game. The way in which Sanders has convinced people to see that which is not there marks the work of a great illusionist.

In order to expose any illusionist's trick, it is required to elaborate on what the illusionist is hoping to accomplish. As I already alluded to in the first paragraph, when healthy, Sanders is looked at as having an immediate positive impact for the Colts defense. With Sanders on the field, supposedly the Colts defense will be significantly better. If that is true, then one would expect there to be a considerable drop off when Sanders is not in the line-up. Instead, what happens is that the Colts defense plays basically the same even without the top-paid safety in the NFL.

With or without Sanders, the Colts played the same level of pass defense. When Sanders was in the game (55 games), opposing quarterbacks completed 65.3% of their passes for 5.8 net yards per pass attempt; sans Sanders in thirty games, opposing quarterbacks completed 65.8% of their passes for 5.7 net yards per pass attempt. The near-mirror image quality of those numbers should come as no surprise since it is well-known Sanders is not that proficient in pass coverage. However, Sander is well known as a good run stopper so he should be expected to really make a difference in the run game when he is in there. There is a slight decrease in opposing rushing totals, from 4.7 yards per rush to 4.3 yards per rush, from when Sanders is not in the game to when he is, but it is certainly not a large enough decrease to warrant all the praise that is heaped upon Sanders's shoulders.

Now that the illusion of Bob Sanders has been explained and debunked, it is time to investigate the misdirection that he uses. In extremely physical sports like football where most of the athletes are on the larger end of the stature spectrum, any starter who is on the smaller side such as Sanders, who stands 5'8 and weighs 206 pounds, is going to be looked at as a kind of Superman and will be immediately noticed and praised for making it to the professional level. People will then assign to these players skills they might not even possess. Sanders is also helped out by the fact he is one of the hardest hitters in the NFL. This leads to his being on highlights and the natural assumption is that the players who make the highlights have to be the best or no one would be wasting time talking about them. Again, attributes will be credited to these players even if they are undeserving. The aura surrounding Bob Sanders is stronger than the reality.

When Sanders is healthy, he is a decent to good safety, but one of the best, he is not. If he were truly one of the best safeties in the NFL and a game changer like his contemporaries Troy Polamalu, Darren Sharper, and Ed Reed, then he should probably have more than six interceptions, two forced fumbles, and three and one half sacks for his career. Bob Sanders is not a great safety, but he should find consolation that he is one of the greatest football illusionists in the game today.

Meet Chris Petersen, Notre Dame's New Coach

After the end of the college football season, if Notre Dame is serious about returning to the college football elite, Charlie Weis will be fired. No matter how the rest of the season turns out for the Fighting Irish, it has become painfully obvious in the fifth season of Weis's tenure that he is a mediocre coach. His failures on the field are many while his successes, outside of outstanding recruiting, are nearly non-existent. Due to the fact Weis has failed on so many coaching fronts, Notre Dame will be looking for a new coach that is almost the exact opposite, and no coach exhibits those traits as strongly as Boise State's current head coach, Chris Petersen.

Unlike Weis, whose game planning advantages exist only in his head, Petersen's teams actually have a game planning advantage when they step on the field. Petersen has shown in games against nationally prominent teams such as Oklahoma and Oregon that when provided the opportunity, his teams can defeat anyone they face, no matter the perceived talent disparity. Those are two more signature wins than Weis will ever have.

In addition, Petersen has shown the ability to develop the talent he recruits instead of forcing his talented recruits to win despite his best efforts. Even though Boise State does not acquire all the five-star and four-star recruits a school like Notre Dame does, one would never know it from looking at the production on the field.

The career of Chris Petersen should also inspire confidence in all of Notre Dame's fans. Petersen is credited with having one of the most innovative offensive minds in college football and he has exhibited this during his nine years at Boise State (five as the offensive coordinator, four as the head coach), keeping Boise State near the top in every offensive category. However, before one thinks that Petersen is only an offensive genius and has no other coaching skills in his offensive repertoire, a look at how Boise State has fared since Dan Hawkins left for Colorado and Petersen took over the head coaching helm is necessary.

Boise State may have reached national prominence under Dan Hawkins, but it is Petersen who has sustained Boise State's elite level of play. It goes without saying that Boise State's offense has maintained their production between Hawkins's tenure and Petersen's since Petersen was the offensive coordinator under Hawkins and is still imprinting himself on the offense today. What is surprising is that it is the defense that has significantly improved under Petersen in terms of yards per pass attempt, decreasing from 6.3 yards per pass attempt in Hawkins's sixty-four games as head coach to 5.9 yards per pass attempt with Petersen as the head coach in forty-six games. Since yards per pass attempt is most closely correlated to points scored in football, this is the biggest improvement a team defense can make. Not only can Petersen coach an excellent offense, but he can oversee an entire football program and improve it in all areas.

Why Chris Petersen would go to Notre Dame is simple; Notre Dame can offer opportunities Boise State cannot. Right now, Petersen is being paid $850,000 yearly to amass a .913 winning percentage, making him one of the more vastly underpaid coaches in college football. To put that into perspective, Notre Dame is paying Charlie Weis more than $4 million for a .596 winning percentage. Also, Notre Dame will give Petersen a chance to win a national championship, something the poll voters will never let happen for a Boise State team no matter how good the team is.

Combining a market-value salary with the chance to win a national championship should provide Petersen with all the incentives he needs to move to Notre Dame. It is up to Notre Dame to make the smart move and try to hire him. Then Notre Dame can sit back and watch the wins pile up and the prestige return for such a historically rich college football program.

Not So Fast, Eli

For once, the majority of New York sports radio hosts were correct. After Jeremy Shockey was injured and the New York Giants went on to win the Super Bowl, the prevalent thinking was that without Shockey, quarterback Eli Manning was finally able to grow as a quarterback and leader without having to worry about Shockey heaping abuse on him at every turn and constantly demanding the ball. Without the pressure of having to appease Shockey, Manning was going to finally take his rightful place among the elite quarterbacks. There is certainly evidence to suggest that Manning's level of play has improved without Shockey on the field, but as far as Manning becoming one of the truly elite quarterbacks in the NFL, that day will never come.

Manning had to endure fifty-two games with Shockey and during those fifty-two games, he was atrocious. He only completed 54.5% of his passes for 6.3 yards per pass attempt, numbers that would warrant any regularly named or late draft round quarterback to be benched in favor of someone who can actually move his team's offense consistently. In the thirty-three games Manning did not have to throw to Shockey, he improved in a statistically significant way, increasing his completion percentage to 59.8% and his yards per pass attempt to 7.1.

Even with the increase in his statistics, Manning is still in the bottom half of the league when it comes to accuracy. Despite all the accolades he receives, Manning has never been in the top half of the league in completion percentage and never will be. The NFL has become a league that values accuracy for its quarterbacks with the average completion percentage increasing yearly; right now, it is around 63-64%. Manning lags far behind that and has never had a full season with a completion percentage above 60.3%. For an explanation on why Eli Manning gets treated and paid like he is one of the game's best quarterbacks, a trip to intro to psychology is necessary.

Manning is no doubt one of sports' biggest beneficiaries of confirmation bias. Confirmation bias is an irrational tendency to search for, interpret, or remember information in a way that confirms preconceptions while avoiding information that contradicts the beliefs. Due to his Manning surname and the fact that Peyton, the best quarterback to ever play the game, is his brother, uneducated football enthusiasts naturally assumed that Manning would play up to Peyton's level. Therefore, they only focus on his game-winning drives and his Super Bowl MVP (extremely undeserved, by the way) and ignore his terrible passing games and his 1.4:1 TD-to-INT ratio. No matter how much evidence appears to undermine the conclusion of Manning being a good quarterback, we all must endure several more years of undeserved praise for Manning.

In Defense of Jorge Posada

A.J. Burnett may not have explicitly stated he would feel more comfortable pitching to Jose Molina over Jorge Posada in the playoffs, but due to his abysmal performance against the Boston Red Sox on August 22nd, where over five innings he gave up nine earned runs and three home runs while pitching to Posada, the prevalent thinking is that Burnett is a significantly better pitcher when Molina is his battery mate. In fact, the popular opinion is so widely accepted that even New York Yankees manager, Joe Girardi, has fallen prey to it. Therefore, Girardi is removing Posada, the 7th most valuable hitter on the Yankees roster according to win probability added, in favor of Molina, who actually does more damage to the Yankees than he does to the opposing team when he bats, under the hope Burnett will perform better on the mound.

At first blush, Burnett's splits with Posada and Molina seem to support Girardi's thinking. Burnett has pitched fifteen starts with Posada behind the plate and eleven when Molina was making the pitching calls. With neither catcher did Burnett pitch deep into games, averaging just a little over six innings no matter which one of the two was receiving. However, there the similarities end. When Posada was his catcher, Burnett had a fielding-independent ERA of 4.84, but his fielding-independent ERA with Molina was over a run less at 3.68. This difference indicates that for every nine innings Burnett pitched, he gave up 1.16 fewer runs with Molina than Posada.

Furthermore, Burnett was a much better strikeout pitcher with Molina, striking out 10.10 batters per nine innings compared to striking out only 7.26 batters per nine innings. By striking out more batters, Burnett pitched to less contact, which helps explain why his gross product average (GPA) against [(OBP*1.8 + SLG/4); read like a batting average] is so much lower with Molina (.225 GPA to .263 GPA).

By now, you the reader probably agree with Girardi in thinking the Yankees have a better chance of winning if Burnett is allowed to pitch to Molina. I caution you against reaching that conclusion. We have already seen what the statistics say at first blush and now we must delve a little deeper.

The disparity between Burnett pitching to Molina and Burnett pitching to Posada is easily explained away by the quality of opponents faced. Burnett's pitching numbers with Posada suffer from the fact that Posada caught all four of Burnett's starts against the Boston Red Sox, the second most prolific offense in the regular season. In his four starts against the Red Sox, Burnett had an abominable fielding-independent ERA of 7.95, allowed the Red Sox hitters to have a .336 GPA against him, gave up 2.65 home runs per nine innings, and had a strikeout-to-walk ratio of 1.00. These four starts completely skew the true picture of what kind of pitcher Burnett is with Posada.

Once those starts are taken out of the equation, the truth is revealed, which is that Burnett is almost the same pitcher with Posada and Molina. His fielding-independent ERA drops to 4.02 in games caught by Posada, which is only .34 runs above his fielding-independent ERA with Molina. The only significant advantage that remains is Burnett's strikeouts per nine innings pitched; even without the Boston Red Sox games, Burnett still struck out only 7.31 batters per nine innings pitched. However, since the now removed Red Sox games accounted for 16 of the 46 walks he gave up with Posada catching him, the strikeout-to-walk ratios are not that dissimilar (2.10 K/BB with Posada to 2.66 K/BB with Molina).

Burnett is not a good enough pitcher with Molina to warrant Girardi's refusal to allow Posada to catch him. No matter who catches him, Burnett is still the same pitcher. What really matters in how he performs is which team he is facing. If the Yankees really want to ensure their postseason success, it might be best to simply disallow A.J. Burnett from pitching to the Red Sox should the occasion arise. As if Yankee fans didn't have enough reasons to root against the Boston Red Sox already, they have one more; the Red Sox are Burnett's kryptonite.

Still Some Value In Lidge

Philadelphia Phillies relief pitcher Brad Lidge has been a disappointment to the sport of baseball over the last several months on a couple of levels. The first level is a fairly obvious one; during the 2009 regular season, Lidge failed to garner a save in eleven of his forty-two save opportunities. For a supposedly elite closer, that is simply inexcusable. Closers are supposed to be the relief pitcher a team can put the most trust in; they give the team confidence that they can get three outs before sacrificing the lead. Lidge betrayed that trust and has left the Philadelphia Phillies in the precarious position of not having a reliable closer entering the postseason.

The second level of disappointment Lidge has been responsible for is the way he Jedi-mind tricked the Philadelphia Phillies into giving him a three-year, $37.5 million contract extension in the middle of the 2008 season. I say that Lidge tricked the Phillies into doing so because I do not want to believe the Phillies would give such a large amount of money for a player who is not only not even elite at his position, but whose career is the epitome of inconsistency. Instead, I choose to believe that the Philadelphia Phillies realize that closer is the most fungible and unreliable position in the sport of baseball. Success in one year from a closer is no guarantee of success in the following year. Except for a couple of closers playing in the sport today, Mariano Rivera and Jonathan Papelbon, there is no one else a team should lock up for more than one to two years at a time.

Still, there is some value left to be found in Brad Lidge in the upcoming postseason, value the Phillies can squeeze out like the last little bit of toothpaste left in the tube. However, they cannot think of Lidge like the closer they are paying him to be. Instead, Lidge should be looked at like an old black and white television set that relies on antennas to acquire reception. When the antennas are in the perfect position and the weather outside is clear, the reception will come in crystal clear. Any variation on that will produce only static. For Lidge, the perfect position for his antennas is saving games where he has at least a three-run lead in the ninth inning.

Saves can be broken down into three categories; there are the three-run saves, the two-run saves, and the one-run save. During the regular season, Lidge had fourteen three-run save opportunities, thirteen two-run save opportunities, and fifteen one-run save opportunities. As the pressure mounted, there was an indirect correlation with how Lidge performed.

In three-run save opportunities, Lidge pitched the best he did all season. He had a 3.66 fielding-independent ERA, 4.00 K/BB ratio, 1.38 HR/9 IP and only allowed batters to hit .269 BA/.321 OBP/.423 SLG/.250 GPA. While those numbers do not top his best seasons, they are a sight better than what he did when the lead was not as large. During two-run save opportunities, he had a 5.42 fielding-independent ERA, 2.43 K/BB ratio, 2.31 HR/9 IP, and .256 BA/.353 OBP/.512 SLG/.287 GPA. Lidge's numbers increased and decreased in all the wrong categories. Then there are Lidge's one-run save opportunities. In those, the only thing that would have classified him as a major league pitcher is his paycheck. His fielding-independent ERA was an abominable 7.33, his K/BB ratio was only 1.08, 2.23 HR/9 IP, and every hitter who came up to plate turned into a MVP as evidenced by his allowing batters to hit .386 BA/.486 OBP/.596 SLG/.368 GPA.

As his statistics suggest, the Phillies need to put Lidge in the least pressure-packed situations if they want him to perform adequately. This does not necessarily mean hiding him in games where the Phillies are being blown out, but he does need to pitch with a sizable lead. Also, it is important to remember no matter how effective Lidge may look under the circumstances I have outlined, the Phillies should not trust him again when the game is truly on the line. There is still some value left in Lidge, but there is not that much.

What A Shame

What a shame it is that the Tampa Bay Buccaneers will not give Josh Johnson a fair chance as the team's starting quarterback. In Josh Johnson, if the Buccaneers do not have the next great young quarterback, they do have a quarterback who will be more than serviceable and will be a great surprise to those who have never heard his name before. Unfortunately, as head coach Raheem Morris has so clearly stated, the Buccaneers are married to the vastly overrated, wildly inaccurate, and terribly overpaid rookie quarterback Josh Freeman, which means Josh Johnson will have to endure the embarrassment of warming the seat for a player clearly inferior to him.

As always, we can look at Josh Johnson's college statistics to see what a crown jewel the Buccaneers have on the roster. With players like Johnson, who played a lesser brand of football at his Division I-AA alma mater, the University of San Diego, it is imperative that they dominate on the college level if they want to succeed in the NFL. There is already a slight regression for Division I-A college quarterbacks, who play at the top level of college football, moving to the NFL and the regression for Division I-AA quarterbacks is even steeper.

In Johnson's case, though, even with the regression he will experience on the NFL level, he will still be a more than adequate quarterback because of his outstanding college football resumé. Over his thirty-two collegiate games, Johnson completed a sublime 67.9% of his 973 passes with 9.2 yards per pass attempt. Even more impressive, Johnson accumulated an amazing 7.7 TD:1 INT ratio. Accuracy is the most important tool a quarterback can have and Johnson possesses it in abundance.

However, Johnson's positive attributes do not stop with his ability to be an extremely proficient passer because he is also an excellent runner and is mobile in the pocket. Despite the fact that in college football quarterback's sacks count against his rushing totals, Johnson still managed to average 6.1 yards per rush every time he took off running with the ball.

What I hope happens is that Johnson remains faithful to who he is as a quarterback. There has been a disturbing trend against black quarterbacks who have the ability to run well to eschew that part of their game, thinking it makes them less of a quarterback. Nothing could be further from the truth. While it is true that those quarterbacks who are actually running backs masquerading as signal callers (i.e., Michael Vick) do not help their teams, uniquely talented quarterbacks like Johnson who can pass and run at an elite level should use all their physical tools available to them every time they step on the football field. Not doing so is to cripple themselves needlessly.

Johnson may not succeed right away because he is playing for a team with many deficiencies, but if the Buccaneers would think with their minds instead of their eyes, he has the chance to lead a resurgence in Buccaneer football. It has been a long time since they had a young, reliable quarterback at the offensive helm and they should treasure their treasure. Keeping Johnson on the field and Freeman buried on the bench is the best course of action for the Buccaneers.

Not Worth The Headache

All men are not created equal. Among us, the talented and the genius and the rich and the beautiful are allowed to take more liberties, given more freedoms, and get away with more antisocial behavior than their more average counterparts. The same rule applies to the world of professional athletes. Sports franchises are more than willing to employ and pay excellent money to criminals or disruptive influences in the locker room as long as the players are producing at a high level on the field and are helping the team to victories. However, there always comes a time with these players when their production on the field is outweighed by all the negative aspects that come with having them on the team. The latest in a long line of players whose cons eventually outweighed their pros is Milton Bradley, major league outfielder who was recently suspended for the rest of the season by the Chicago Cubs for detrimental conduct.

The Chicago Cubs can call it whatever they want, but the real reason they have suspended Milton Bradley and will seek to trade him in the off-season is simply buyer's remorse. They committed the cardinal sin of giving a player of Bradley's personality make-up a long-term contract (three years, $30 million contract) and now are seeking to correct the situation. When dealing with headaches, it is best to keep them on a series of one-year contracts for below market value compensation. By not doing so, they give the athlete reinforcement that his behavior will be accepted and that the team sees no reason for him to change, leading him to inevitably act out.

Fortunately for the Cubs, the contract was structured so that if they can trick a team into taking on Bradley and his onerous salary, they will have only been on the hook for $9 million of the $30 million; there was a signing bonus of $4 million and a 2009 salary of $5 million. Not only will they be getting rid of a player who is not worth the money, but they will be doing something almost every sports franchise wants to do in these economic climates. That is, the Cubs want to cut payroll and Milton Bradley has given them the perfect excuse to do so.

With his latest disparaging comments about the Chicago Cubs, he forced the Cubs to re-evaluate just how valuable a player he is and he did so at the worst time. This season marks the worst Bradley has had since 2004 with the Los Angeles Dodgers. Although his on-base percentage has been a very respectable .378, as a corner outfielder, his job is to provide power to the line-up and there he has failed miserably. His .397 slugging percentage ranks near the bottom of all qualified hitters, making him one of the more overpaid players in baseball for the paltry value he is providing. Even more troubling is his isolated power (slugging average minus batting average) of .140, his lowest such total since 2002. Isolated power is a reliable indicator of much of a true power hitter a player is because it only counts extra base hits; it also allows one to observe the start of a decline in a player's production. Bradley's precipitous drop in isolated power from 2008 to 2009 (.242 to .140) most likely foreshadows the fact his power is a thing of the past, making him and his albatross of a contract even more of a liability for the Cubs. They will never get their money's worth out of Bradley.

Truth be told, the Cubs should have never given Milton Bradley that much money, but they have a history of overpaying free agent players coming off of great statistics in contract years. Although he may get a lot of media attention, Bradley is nothing more than an okay player, deserving of okay player money, which is why several teams have given up on him in the past. If he were better, then he would have stayed with teams longer instead of playing for seven teams over ten seasons. The Cubs are just the seventh team to figure out the obvious; Milton Bradley's production is not worth the extra headaches of having him on the roster.

Then What?

There is a phenomenon among sports fans, especially when they are required to deal with quarterbacks who perform incompetently, to spend most of their energies in voicing their displeasure with the players and proclaiming loudly that they are ready for a change in who plays the position. This behavior is all well and good when there is a back-up quarterback who is a viable alternative and an improvement upon the incumbent. Yet, as is usually the case there is no savior waiting on the sidelines for the chance to lead the team to a string of victories. Instead, the reality is the back-up quarterback is either inferior to the starter or on the same mediocre level as the struggling starter as Carolina Panthers fans will find out if Jake Delhomme is benched in favor of Matt Moore or A.J. Feeley.

Do not get me wrong; I am the driver of the get rid of Jake Delhomme bandwagon. For years, I have thought and his play has reinforced the fact he is a below-average passer, turnover-prone quarterback who does more to help his team lose than he does to help them win.

The problem is the number two quarterback on the roster, Matt Moore, is nothing more than a younger version of Jake Delhomme. Over his college career, which spanned stints at UCLA and Oregon State, Moore put up very underwhelming numbers of a 58.9% completion percentage, 7.5 yards per pass attempt, and touchdown to interception ratio of about 1:1. Since a quarterback's college numbers are a pretty good indicator of what he will be able to do on the NFL level, we can be fairly certain that Moore will be just as maddening to watch as Delhomme. In fact, it would not be a surprise if he ended up throwing interceptions at a higher rate than Delhomme's current 1.5 TD:1 INT. No matter how you look at the statistics, if Moore is ever given the reins to the Carolina Panthers offense, there will be more inaccuracy and more interceptions than any fan should be subjected to.

Then we have the third-string quarterback A.J. Feeley, who is also not a quarterback a team should rely upon for anything other than ensuring they go on a losing streak. With his eight complete seasons in the NFL, Feeley has enough of a track record that there is no secret about what kind of starting quarterback he is. He is someone who will struggle to complete a little more than 55% of his passes, in a league where the average quarterback's completion percentage is over 60%, while throwing just as many interceptions as touchdowns. In fact, there has already been one NFL team foolish enough to give him the chance to start meaningful games, and the Miami Dolphins got from Feeley exactly what they deserved: a season of 53.7% passing, 5.3 yards per pass attempt, and 11 touchdowns to 15 interceptions. The Carolina Panthers can expect the same.

As of right now, the Carolina Panthers are stuck right now with Jake Delhomme and will have to struggle with the erratic play that comes along with him. If they do decide to replace him with the other quarterbacks currently on the roster, at best they can expect a reincarnation of Jake Delhomme. The best thing the Panthers can do is to select one of the several superb senior quarterbacks who will be available in next year's draft. Surely their fans can wait that long to know there is quarterback relief just over the horizon.

What A Difference Two Seasons Make

Yao Ming's broken foot could not have come at a worse time for the future of the Houston Rockets. Before Ming broke his foot during the playoff series against the Los Angeles Lakers, the Rockets were finally going to be able to break up their two superstar partnership, which has netted them one playoff series win, four playoff series losses, and countless overtime hours for the Rockets training staff because of the competition Yao Ming and Tracy McGrady are in to see which of them can miss the most games. At a time when it was imperative that the Rockets divorce themselves of the rapidly deteroriating Tracy McGrady and his bloated 2009-10 salary of a little over $23.2 million, they may now wrongfully feel they need to depend on him to carry the team with Ming most likely out for the season. Unfortunately for the Rockets, they will find out if they do not already know that McGrady is no longer up to that task.

Over two years ago, I wrote that between the two players, McGrady and Ming, that it was McGrady the Rockets should hitch their wagon behind. A lot has changed since then. As both McGrady and Ming were kind enough to each miss significant time during the latest two seasons, Ming in 2007-08 and McGrady in 2008-09, which allowed me to measure the effectiveness of each without the other.

McGrady is no longer able to up his game and put up better numbers without Yao on the court. Playing with Yao in 2007-08, McGrady averaged 21.5 points per game on 51.0 TS% and 1.02 points per shot attempt, all numbers that are a little below his career averages so he is not even up to playing like vintage McGrady when he has Yao. That is why it should be no surprise that without Yao, McGrady's play suffers since defenses can key on him more. Without Yao, McGrady averaged 22.0 points per game on 46.4 TS% and 0.93 points per shot attempt. The only reason he averaged a little more points per game without Ming is because he took 2.6 more field goal attempts per game. McGrady's days of being a franchise player are over.

In 2008-09, Ming also had a change of playing character. In seasons previous, without McGrady, Ming had come up aggravatingly smaller. No longer was that the cast. Ming actually put up better numbers with McGrady out of the line-up and in street clothes. He averaged 19.2 points per game on 60.7 TS% and 1.21 points per shot attempt with McGrady and 20.0 points per game on 62.3 TS% and 1.25 points per game without McGrady. It is not a great jump, but the fact Ming even put up any better numbers without McGrady is a good start. The problem now is he is out for the year so his development as the go-to player of the Houston Rockets is being stunted.

If the Houston Rockets are as smart of a franchise as they seem to be, they will choose not to retain McGrady's services and his virulent strain of basketball progeria after his contract ends after the upcoming season. Instead, Adelman will work on constructing an offense that does not rely too heavily on an aging player who can no longer deliver on a superstar level. In fact, the Rockets would be smart to not invest too much in Yao Ming anymore as it has become painfully evident his legs and feet cannot support his frame under the duress of eighty-two games plus of basketball. The McGrady-Yao experiment should be ended and labeled a failure for the sake of the future health of the Houston Rockets franchise.

Overrated Coach

Usually when the adjective overrated is used in the realm of athletics, it is describing an athlete. This time around, I would like to use it to discuss the newest head coach of the University of Virginia men's basketball team: former Washington State head coach Tony Bennett. Almost two years ago, I wrote about my reasoning for why I disagreed with Bennett winning Coach of the Year. Since then, Bennett's Washington State teams have done nothing to change my conclusion about his coaching acumen and in fact, I am more sure than ever that I was right in thinking Bennett might just be a good coach and not a program-changing one. That spells trouble for the University of Virginia if they think that is the kind of coach they are getting.

As I laid out in my first post about Tony Bennett, he did do an admirable job at Washington State in his first year, helped along by the fact he was working with a roster stability of .85. He coached his team to a 26-8 record and on the way, the Cougars outscored their opponents by 12.1 points per 100 possessions.

His second year was even better even though his team lost one more game that season (26-9). The Cougars made it all the way to the third round of the NCAA tournament by having a positive margin over their opponents of 18.0 points per 100 possessions. Then again, he was working with the extreme advantage of coaching a team with a roster stability of .98, meaning he had almost the exact same team from the previous season. It is a well-documented fact that a team's performance will improve the longer said team plays together. Bennett was just reaping that benefit.

Not until this past season, Bennett's third as head coach at Washington State, was Bennett facing a position where all the cards were not stacked in his favor. The first obstacle Bennett had to overcome was his lowest roster stability as a head coach (.63); that roster stability is the equivalent of losing two position players from a team. Bennett failed to do so, with his team only garnering a 17-16 record and a margin of 5.7 points per 100 possessions. A truly excellent coach would not have allowed losing a few players to turn his team into a mediocre one.

Take Bill Self, for example, who I consider to be one of the great active college basketball head coaches. His 2007-08 Kansas Jayhawks won the national championship and then he had to sit and watch as his starting five either graduated or left early to go into the NBA. Yet, this season, he still managed to take a team with a roster stability of .45 comprised nearly completely of new parts to the third round of the NCAA tournament, where they bowed out to a Michigan State team that is now in the Final Four.

Until Tony Bennett can show he can reload his team, even after losing key parts, and still lead them to great heights in the college basketball world, he will never be more than a good coach, who will be able to put together a couple of outstanding years if his players stick around.

Cooling Off On John Beck

Two years ago, during the 2006 college football season and before the 2007 NFL draft, I was the driver of the John Beck bandwagon. I told anyone who would listen to me that John Beck was an excellent NFL prospect and that teams should be looking to draft him ahead of more famous quarterbacks like Brady Quinn. Now, two years later, I have to admit that I may have been too hasty with my effusive praise for John Beck and that I have begun to cool on him as an NFL player. This is not to say that he was not a very good college quarterback, but the fact is with the way his successor, Max Hall, has played is keeping John Beck from being a special college quarterback.

The years I will be using to compare John Beck and Max Hall to each other are the last two years of Beck's college career and then Hall's two years as a starting quarterback. I only chose the last two years of Beck's career because 2005 was the year Bronco Mendenhall took over the reins as head coach and brought over Robert Anae from Texas Tech to be the offensive coordinator. It was in that season that Anae's system turned Beck from a quarterback whose completion percentage was hovering between 52%-55% to a 64.5% passer.

Hall did not have as great a year in his first year as starting quarterback under Anae as Beck did, only completing 60.1% and 7.8 yards per pass attempt to Beck's 64.5% and 7.2 yards per pass attempt. However, comparison of the two quarterback's two years under Anae shows the competition is basically a wash. Beck has slightly superior passing statistics (66.7% completion percentage/8.2 yards per pass attempt to 64.5% completion percentage/8.0 yards per pass attempt) than Hall, but they are not statistically significantly better, which reiterates the fact Beck was a product of the offensive scheme in which he was playing.

Anytime there are successive college quarterbacks who play under the same offensive coordinator and combine a large number of pass attempts per game with a high completion percentage with seemingly no drop-off no matter who the quarterback, it should scream to the observer that these are quarterbacks who are made by the system and probably would not have as much success if they play for someone else. The fact there is no drop-off in production from BYU quarterbacks demonstrates John Beck was probably not worthy of all the accolades with which I wanted to anoint him.

Quarterback Drafters Beware

A warning must be issued and restraint must be exercised. There are NFL draft pundits and experts who would have you believe that Matthew Stafford, Mark Sanchez, and Josh Freeman are all quarterback prospects who are worthy of first-round draft selections and first-round contracts. Ignore their words at all cost for they are sorely mistook. No quarterback this year deserves to be drafted in the first round because they have deficiencies that make investing so much money in them more risk than reward.

During this past college football season, every time I heard someone say Matthew Stafford of Georgia was a future first-round selection, I kept wondering who this other Matthew Stafford was who was so great since it was definitely not the one I saw suiting up for the Georgia Bulldogs. The one I saw was a mediocre college quarterback and to expect him to suddenly improve drastically and be a player a franchise can build around is ludicrous. For his career, he completed 57.1% of his passes in meaningful games (where he either attempted the most passes for his team or threw for the most amount of yardage). I have well documented how college completion percentages translate to the NFL stage and there is simply no place for a quarterback with such a low completion percentage. Even at Stafford's best, he will be a below average NFL quarterback, powerful arm strength or not. It does not matter if he can make all the throws if he will miss all the throws almost as often.

When it comes to Mark Sanchez, formerly of the USC Trojans, his is the story that is most tragic because he probably could have been a good NFL quarterback if he had just listened to head coach Pete Carroll who told him he is not ready for the NFL. Sanchez only attempted 476 meaningful passes in college with only one season as a full-time starter. While that may still be more than Vick threw during his years at Virginia Tech, it is not enough to determine what kind of quarterback a player will be at the highest level; his resume is lacking valuable experience and the NFL is not in the business of allowing first-round quarterbacks time to develop. Most likely, Sanchez will never get the repetitions he needs to be successful. Another year of completing 65.8% of his passes and Sanchez would have been worthy to be selected in the first round. As it stands now, he is unfortunately not.

Former Kansas State junior Josh Freeman's declaration for the draft is a head-scratcher by itself. The fact people are actually contemplating picking him in the first round is like a person taking a poison ivy bath followed by drying off with a poison oak towel. After one strips away his physical gifts and looks only at his quarterbacking numbers, what is left is someone with a 59.5% completion percentage, but with a completion percentage standard deviation of .130 so he is not a very consistent quarterback, either; to be inconsistent on top of being an erratic passer is the quarterback version of adding insult to injury. Consider Freeman another quarterback no franchise can depend upon to lead them anywhere but deep into mediocrity.

For Stafford and Freeman, the problem is their paltry completion percentages. For qualified NFL quarterbacks in 2008 (according to nfl.com), the median completion percentage was 61.3%. The league is moving in the direction where a quarterback needs to be incredibly accurate to carry an offense. Neither Stafford nor Freeman is a quarterback like that. Sanchez, on the other hand, simply lacks the experience necessary to make the transition to the NFL unless he is given three or fours years in the same system to improve himself as a quarterback. The pressure of being a first-round selection will not afford him that opportunity. Even though the reasons might be different, none of these quarterbacks should be taken with the first thirty-two picks of the NFL draft come April 25th.

Reality Check for Pat Summitt

The effects of a bruised ego are a terrible thing to behold and probably no one's ego is suffering more internal bleeding than Pat Summitt's. Summitt, who has the most victories of any active basketball coach in the NCAA, lost for the first time ever in the first round of an NCAA women's tournament, prompting her to force her team to practice when their season is undeniably over. What she hopes to accomplish is anyone's guess besides becoming a real life example of what happens when a person makes an assumption. The assumption in this case is that Tennessee should have won their game against Ball State. Reality says Ball State was the better team when the two colleges faced off.

Taking the season in its entirety, Tennessee possessed the better cumulative statistics. In the thirty-two games Tennessee played before facing Ball State, Tennessee was outscoring opponents by 9.2 points per 100 possessions. Ball State was only outscoring their foes by 5.8 points per 100 possessions. Perhaps that is why Summitt was so angry after losing by sixteen points to what she saw as an inferior opponent.

However, Ball State got off to a mediocre start at the beginning of their season, going 7-6 in their first thirteen games, before really kicking their play into high gear once conference play began where they went 17-2 over the last nineteen games. Tennessee was a respectable 11-2 in their first thirteen games before they entered their conference schedule. Then they faltered down the home stretch and into the tournament, going 11-8.

Once one compares the two teams after they got into the heart of their respective schedules, one finds out Ball State was playing better basketball than Tennessee. During Ball State's last nineteen games, they were beating their opponents by 13.5 points per 100 possessions, much higher than Tennessee's positive margin of 2.8 points per 100 possessions. Ball State was also shooting much better than the field from Tennessee (55.7 TS& to 49.4 TS%); so in actuality, before the game even began, it had all the markings of a victory for Ball State. They were quite simply playing a better brand of basketball and perhaps with a greater degree of confidence despite the fact they were only a twelve seed squaring off against a five seed.

The time for Pat Summitt to put her team through the paces is not now when there are no more opponents left on the schedule just because she chose not to give her opponent any credit. Instead, she should trust in the fact that her young team will improve next year due to roster stability. That, more than any sort of wind sprints or suicides she makes her team run, will ensure they do not suffer the same slump during the part of their schedule where they play teams from the SEC conference.