best counter

Your Ad Here
Just The Sports: 2011-02-13

Just The Sports

Friday, February 18, 2011

Matthew Stafford Has Been Outplayed By His Back-Ups

Quarterback Matthew Stafford's inability to stay healthy should not be the most concerning aspect of his career to his employer, the Detroit Lions. What should trouble the Lions more than the fact the former number one overall draft pick and recipient of $41.7 million in guaranteed money has only been the primary quarterback for the Lions in 12 games over two seasons, games in which he either attempted the most passes or threw for the most yards, is how he played when he has been healthy.

In those twelve games, Stafford struggled mightily. His completion percentage was an extremely poor 53.9 percent and he also performed ineptly in other passing categories. Stafford's passes only netted him 5.9 yards per pass attempt, 4.7 adjusted yards per pass attempt, 5.2 net yards per pass attempt, and 4.0 adjusted yards per pass attempt. When one looks up mediocre passing in the dictionary, a statistical line similar to that is what will be found.

Additionally, in those 12 games, Stafford threw 19 touchdowns (4.1 touchdown percentage) to 21 interceptions (4.6 interception percentage). The touchdown to interception ratio Stafford possessed in the 12 contests is not awful considering many quarterbacks throw more interceptions than touchdowns early in their career, but it cannot make up for his other pedestrian statistics.

Stafford's already middling performances look even worse when one realizes he has been outplayed by the very quarterbacks he is supposed to be better than.

Since Stafford has missed 20 games over the past two seasons, there have been 20 opportunities for one of his three back-up quarterbacks to be the primary quarterback for the Lions, and they have made the most of each opportunity.

When comparing Stafford's statistics to whichever back-up quarterback was the primary quarterback when Stafford was not, Stafford was 9.6 percent worse in completion percentage (53.9 percent to 59.6 percent), 6.3 percent worse in yards per pass attempt (5.9 to 6.3), 11.3 percent worse in adjusted yards per pass attempt (4.7 to 5.3), 7.1 percent worse in net yards per pass attempt (5.2 to 5.6), and 13.0 percent worse in adjusted net yards per pass attempt (4.0 to 4.6).

Stafford holds the advantage in his touchdown (4.1 touchdown percentage to 3.2 touchdown percentage) to interception (4.6 interception percentage to 3.8 interception percentage) ratio, but just like it did not make up for the other deficiencies he had in his overall passing numbers, it cannot overcome the advantages his back-up quarterbacks currently hold over him.

If Stafford were being backed up by elite quarterbacks, then his inferior play could be understood, but he is not. His three back-ups were Daunte Culpepper whose career was in a serious decline when he played for the Lions, Shaun Hill who is never a long-term solution for any team's quarterback problem unless he is playing for Mike Martz, and Drew Stanton who is a former second-round draft pick and a quarterback to whom the Lions never gave a fair shot.

Also, Stafford's back-ups were not even playing well; yet, they still outperformed the supposed franchise quarterback. If a starting quarterback cannot outplay such below-average talent, then he does not deserve to start nor does he deserve to be paid tens of millions of dollars for his paltry efforts.

Perhaps Stafford will discover the ability to make it through an entire season unscathed and outplay his back-ups, but as things stand now, the Lions' already dubious decision to draft Stafford with the number one pick in the 2009 NFL Draft looks even more foolish.

Labels: , , , , ,

Thursday, February 17, 2011

2011 NFL Draft: A.J. Green vs. Julio Jones

Neither former University of Georgia wide receiver A.J. Green nor former University of Alabama wide receiver Julio Jones is one of the top two wide receivers in the 2011 NFL Draft; that distinction goes to Jonathan Baldwin and Aldrick Robinson. Yet, since most people seem to view Green and Jones as the two premier wide receivers in the upcoming draft, at the very least, they should know which one is the better wide receiver prospect. That way they can avoid overvaluing the wrong wide receiver.

Of the two, without a doubt, Green was the more complete college wide receiver, and the player more likely to find success in the NFL.

Just as I did with Baldwin and Robinson in order to measure the value of their presence in the passing game, I looked at how Green's quarterbacks performed when he was included in their statistics to when he was removed.

Over the course of his career, after Green was removed from their passing statistics in games in which he played and was targeted for a pass, Georgia quarterbacks became 2.9 percent worse in completion percentage (from 59.1 percent to 57.4 percent), 8.3 percent worse in yards per pass attempt (from 8.4 to 7.7), 4.9 percent worse in yards per completion (14.2 to 13.5), and 10.6 percent worse in touchdown percentage (6.6 percent to 5.9 percent).

Under the same conditions, when Jones was removed from Alabama's quarterbacks' statistics, they experienced a 3.0 percent increase in completion percentage (from 62.9 percent to 64.8 percent), a 3.7 percent decrease in yards per pass attempt (from 8.2 to 7.9), a 6.2 percent decrease in yards per completion (from 13.0 to 12.2), and a 2.0 percent increase in touchdown percentage (from 5.1 percent to 5.2 percent).

Although Jones has a slight edge over Green in terms of the value provided to their respective quarterbacks' yards per completion averages, Green blows Jones away in value provided in completion percentage, yards per pass attempt average, and touchdown percentage.

The only explanation for the hype still surrounding Jones has to be because of his freshman season when he exploded on the college football landscape in tremendous fashion.

In that year, when Jones is removed from Alabama quarterbacks' statistics, they underwent a 1.5 percent increase in completion percentage (from 58.4 percent to 59.3 percent), an 11.1 percent decrease in yards per pass attempt (from 7.2 to 6.4), a 13.0 percent decrease in yards per completion (from 12.3 to 10.7), and a 9.1 percent decrease in touchdown percentage (from 3.3 percent to 3.0 percent).

If Jones had been able to even come close to maintaining that level of value for the rest of his college career, then he could rightly be considered to be one of the best wide receiver prospects in the draft. Instead, he followed his spectacular freshman season with an awful sophomore year.

During his sophomore season, when Jones was removed from his quarterbacks' statistics, they became 9.4 percent better in completion percentage (from 59.7 percent to 65.3 percent), 6.8 percent better in yards per pass attempt (from 7.4 to 7.9), 3.2 percent worse in yards per completion (from 12.5 to 12.1), and 4.3 percent better in touchdown percentage (from 4.7 percent to 4.9 percent).

An elite wide receiver whose quarterbacks get that much better when not throwing in his direction does not exist because there is no such thing. Jones' sophomore season was representative of a wide receiver with below-average ability.

Jones did improve in his junior season, but he did not come close to the level of value he provided his quarterbacks as a freshman. For his junior season, when Jones was removed from Alabama's quarterbacks' passing statistics, they experienced a .6 percent decrease in completion percentage (from 70.0 percent to 69.6 percent), a 2.1 percent decrease in yards per pass attempt (from 9.7 to 9.5), a 2.2 percent decrease in yards per completion (from 13.9 to 13.6), and a 5.6 percent increase in touchdown percentage (from 7.2 percent to 7.6 percent).

Alabama quarterbacks received only the slimmest of benefits when throwing in Jones' direction in the 2010 season, and any NFL team that drafts Jones thinking it will be obtaining an impact wide receiver will be sorely disappointed.

Green's college career was also an inconsistent one, but even at his worst, Green never turned in a season as disappointing as Jones.

Relative to Jones, Green had a minimal impact in his freshman year. After Green was removed from Georgia's quarterbacks' statistics, they became 4.1 percent better in completion percentage (from 61.5 percent to 64.0 percent), 2.2 percent worse in yards per pass attempt (from 8.9 to 8.7), 5.5 percent worse in yards per completion (from 14.5 to 13.7), and 5.9 percent worse in touchdown percentage (from 6.8 percent to 6.4 percent).

Although Green's career did not start with the bang that Jones' career did, nor did Green's quarterbacks get worse when throwing to Green in his freshman season, which was Green's worst year in college.

Green's best college season took place in his spectacularly valuable sophomore campaign. That season, when he was removed from Georgia's quarterbacks' statistics, they underwent a 10.4 percent decrease in completion percentage (from 54.0 percent to 48.4 percent), an 18.3 percent decrease in yards per pass attempt (from 7.1 to 5.8), a 9.1 percent decrease in yards per completion (from 13.2 to 12.0), and an 8.9 percent decrease in touchdown percentage (from 5.6 percent to 5.1 percent).

Green's best season eclipses Jones' best season in overall value. It also eclipses Green's other two seasons as he was unable to duplicate his sophomore exploits and regressed fairly significantly during his junior season. However, even with the regression, Georgia's quarterbacks were still made better by throwing to Green.

As a junior in his suspension-shortened season, when Green was removed from his quarterbacks' statistics, they become 6.2 percent worse in completion percentage (from 61.0 percent to 57.2 percent), 6.7 percent worse in yards per pass attempt (from 9.0 to 8.4), .7 percent worse in yards per completion (from 14.7 to 14.6), and 21.1 percent worse in touchdown percentage (from 7.6 percent to 6.0 percent).

In addition to being a more complete wide receiver, Green's best season in college was better than Jones' best season, and his worst year was superior to Jones' worst year. If a team ignores Baldwin or Robinson and decides to choose between Green and Jones instead, Green is obviously the better option.

Labels: , , , ,

Wednesday, February 16, 2011

Jay Cutler Is Latest Beneficiary Of The Mike Martz Effect

No matter what kind of quarterback a player was before or what kind of quarterback he will be afterwards, while he is playing in Mike Martz's offensive system, he will have the best seasons of his career in terms of yards per pass attempt and yards per completion. The quarterback may very well have career-high seasons in other areas, but the improvements in yards per pass attempt and yards per completion are the most consistent results of playing for Martz.

The Martz Effect first presented itself in the NFL in the career of Kurt Warner. Martz did not entirely make Kurt Warner as Warner went on to have success with other teams in his career, but Warner never reached the heights in yards per completion and yards per attempt for those teams that he did under Martz.

In his 56 games as primary quarterback under Martz, games in which he either attempted the most passes or threw for the most passing yards for the team, Warner posted averages of 8.6 yards per pass attempt and 13.0 yards per completion.

Both of those statistics are statistically significantly better than what he did as primary quarterback for non-Martz offenses where in 74 games, Warner's passes netted 7.6 yards per pass attempt and 11.7 yards per completion.

Playing for Martz, Warner also had his best seasons in terms of touchdown percentage. His touchdown percentage was a statistically significant superior 6.1 touchdown percentage than his 4.7 touchdown percentage playing in other offenses.

However, Warner also had a statistically significant higher interception percentage under Martz (3.8 interception percentage) than he did playing for other coaches (2.6 interception percentage). Since the advantage he holds in touchdown percentage (29.8 percent higher) in lower than the disadvantage he holds in interception percentage (46.2 percent higher), he actually was worse under Martz in his touchdown to interception ratio.

During Warner's tenure as primary quarterback under Martz, there were six games in the 2000 season where Trent Green stepped in as primary quarterback. Even though Green only received those six games as a primary quarterback under Martz, he still put up numbers better than what he did for the rest of his career.

For those six games, Green gained 8.3 yards per pass attempt and 13.8 yards per completion. His yards per attempt average was 10.7 percent better than the 7.5 yards per pass attempt he averaged in his 111 other games as primary quarterback, and his yards per completion average was 11.3 percent better than his 12.4 yards per completion in other games.

Green also threw an amazingly high rate of touchdown passes during those six games, posting an impressive 6.6 touchdown percentage in relief of Warner. That touchdown percentage was 57.1 percent higher than his 4.2 touchdown percentage for the rest of his career.

Despite playing in such a short time span, Green still had his best games under Martz.

Marc Bulger was the next quarterback who benefited from having Martz direct the offense, and like Warner and Green before him, Bulger's yards per pass attempt and yards per completion averages were the best of his career.

During his 42 games as primary quarterback for Martz, Bulger gained 7.8 yards per pass attempt and 12.2 yards per completion, which were statistically significantly better than the 6.7 yards per pass attempt and 11.2 yards per completion he has gained without Martz.

Further cementing the fact that Bulger experienced his best seasons while playing in Martz's offense, his 64.4 completion percentage is statistically significantly better than the 59.7 completion percentage he has had in other offenses as is his 4.6 touchdown percentage statistically significantly higher than his 3.1 touchdown percentage he has posted in non-Martz offenses.

Bulger's 3.5 interception percentage under Martz is also statistically significantly higher than the 2.5 interception percentage he has accumulated in other offenses, but unlike Warner, Bulger still had a better touchdown to interception ratio playing for Martz.

Martz's offensive scheme is so friendly to quarterbacks that even Jon Kitna and Shaun Hill, two quarterbacks who will never be confused for star quarterbacks, also saw improvements while playing for Martz.

For Kitna, the improvement he had in yards per completion was fairly minimal compared to other Martz-coached quarterbacks; the 11.4 yards per completion his passes netted in the 32 games he played as Martz's primary quarterback is only 3.6 percent higher than the 11.0 yards per completion his passes have netted in his 99 other games as primary quarterback in the NFL.

Where Kitna truly excelled under Martz were in a higher completion percentage and a higher yards per attempt average. Kitna's 62.8 completion percentage and 7.2 yards per pass attempt are statistically significantly superior to the 59.2 completion percentage and 6.5 yards per attempt he has produced in his other offenses.

Similarly to Green, Hill played in a limited number of games as Martz's primary quarterback, and in those nine games, he played the best football of his career.

Comparing his time in Martz's system to when he has played outside of it, Hill's completion percentage is 2.3 percent higher (62.8 percent to 61.4 percent), his yards per pass attempt average is 10.9 percent higher (7.1 to 6.4), and his yards per completion average is 8.7 percent higher (11.3 to 10.4). Again, under Martz, a quarterback had his best yards per pass attempt and yards per completion averages.

In his first season playing for Martz, current Martz primary quarterback Jay Cutler has already benefited from the Martz Effect; in his 16 games as primary quarterback for the 2010 season, Cutler's passes gained 7.7 yards per pass attempt and 12.9 yards per completion.

Cutler's yards per pass attempt average under Martz is 6.9 percent higher than the 7.2 yards per pass attempt average he had in his 52 other contests as primary quarterback, and his yards per completion average under Martz is 11.2 percent higher than the 11.6 yards per completion average he had when not playing under Martz.

The rest of the time Cutler spends playing for Martz should result in similar statistics.

With the way in which Martz is able to take any quarterback, regardless of the player's talent level, and elevate his passing statistics, Martz is rightly regarded as one of the preeminent offensive minds in the NFL.

Labels: , , , , , , ,

Tuesday, February 15, 2011

Carson Palmer Is Vastly Overestimating His Worth

It takes two to tango is an idiom that can extended to the world of sports trades. Just because a team wishes to trade away a player or a player wishes to be traded away does not guarantee there will be a second party willing to facilitate the transaction especially if that player is in the midst of a decline in ability, a fact with which Cincinnati Bengals quarterback Carson Palmer would do well to familiarize himself.

Before Palmer demanded a trade from the Cincinnati Bengals, the best thing he could have done was to perform an honest assessment of his career. If he had, here is what he would have found.

After a good start to his career, the wheels started coming off in Palmer's injury-truncated 2008 season. Even before Palmer was diagnosed with a partially torn ligament and tendon in his elbow, he was on his way to having a disappointing year.

In those four games, Palmer completed only 58.1 percent of his passes, gained 5.7 yards per pass attempt, gained 4.7 adjusted yards per pass attempt, gained 4.7 net yards per pass attempt, gained 3.9 adjusted net yards per pass attempt, threw three touchdowns (2.3 touchdown percentage) to four interceptions (3.1 interception percentage), and was sacked 11 times (7.9 sack percentage).

Unfortunately for Palmer, those four games were not just a minor hiccup in his career before he returned to his previous high levels of production. Instead, they represented the beginning of a downward spiral in Palmer's play.

Including that 2008 season with the following 2009 and 2010 seasons demonstrates that Palmer is but a shell of the quarterback he once was. In those seasons in games where he was the primary quarterback, games in which he either threw the most passes or threw for the most passing yards per the Bengals, Palmer managed to complete just 60.6 percent of his passes, gained 6.5 yards per pass attempt, gained 6.0 adjusted yards per pass attempt, gained 5.8 net yards per pass attempt, gained 5.2 adjusted net yards per pass attempt, threw 51 touchdowns (4.2 touchdown percentage) to 38 interceptions (3.1 interception percentage), and was sacked 66 times (5.1 sack percentage).

Those numbers measure up poorly to what he did from 2004-2007 where as the Bengals' primary quarterback, Palmer completed 64.1 percent of his passes, gained 7.3 yards per pass attempt, gained 6.9 adjusted yards per pass attempt, gained 6.7 net yards per pass attempt, gained 6.3 adjusted net yards per pass attempt, threw 104 touchdowns (5.1 touchdown percentage) to 63 interceptions (3.1 interception percentage), and was sacked 97 times (4.6 sack percentage).

Compared to how he performed from 2004-2007, since then, Palmer has been a statistically significantly worse quarterback in terms of completion percentage, yards per pass attempt, adjusted yards per pass attempt, net yards per pass attempt, and adjusted net yards per pass attempt. He has also performed worse in his touchdown percentage and sack percentage.

That sort of precipitous drop-off in production should make Palmer unpalatable to any team interested in winning a high percentage of games and being a championship contender.

If Palmer had had just one down year, that could be forgiven and he could still be regarded as a quarterback a team would wish to have on its roster, but with each pass he has thrown since the 2008 season began, Palmer has made it obvious that he is no longer capable of elite quarterback play.

Expecting him to experience an incredible turnaround and return to the form he had from 2004-2007 is expecting too much, but his decline is only one stumbling block standing in the way of a trade.

His contract is another. Palmer is due to be paid $11.5 million next season and it is unlikely he would take a pay cut, thereby making Palmer the perfect example of the ultimate undesirable player. Not only is he in serious decline from where his career began, but he is still being paid like the franchise quarterback he no longer is.

Why Palmer thinks that at the stage in his career when he is playing his worst football he would be desirable to another team is perplexing. Any team interested in acquiring a below-average quarterback can certainly do so for a fraction of the cost and without giving up any draft picks. Trading for Carson Palmer to accomplish such a goal is unnecessary.

Labels: , ,

Monday, February 14, 2011

Jonathan Baldwin's and Aldrick Robinson's NFL Prospects: They Are The Next Big-Play Wide Receivers

Pittsburgh Steelers wide receiver Mike Wallace will soon have company among the NFL's best big-play wide receivers, provided by the presence of future rookies, former University of Pittsburgh wide receiver Jonathan Baldwin and former Southern Methodist University wide receiver Aldrick Robinson.

A wide receiver's first priority is always to make his quarterback better, and the best wide receivers are the ones who can improve their quarterback's passing statistics the most. As a measuring tool for just how much having the wide receiver in the passing game raises the level of a quarterback's play, I compared how the wide receivers' quarterbacks played when the wide receivers' statistics are included in the passing totals to the same quarterbacks' numbers when the wide receivers' statistics are removed.

Under that condition, Jonathan Baldwin is not just the best big-play wide receiver in the 2011 NFL draft class, but he is the best overall wide receiver of the 10 wide receivers whose college careers I examined, a list which includes the more highly regarded former University of Georgia wide receiver and former University of Alabama wide receiver Julio Jones.

For Baldwin's college career, compared to when Baldwin's statistics were included in the Pittsburgh quarterbacks' numbers to when they were removed, Pittsburgh quarterbacks experienced a 4.3 percent increase in completion percentage (from 62.2 percent to 64.9 percent), a 9.3 percent decrease in yards per pass attempt (from 7.5 to 6.8), a 12.5 percent decrease in yards per completion (from 12.0 to 10.5), and a 19.6 percent decrease in touchdown percentage (from 4.6 percent to 3.5 percent).

Due to the fact Baldwin's routes are usually of the deep variety, which are the hardest to consistently complete, he will never be a quarterback's completion percentage's best friend, but the increased value he provides in other areas more than makes up for that.

Baldwin was such a valuable big-play wide receiver in college that the decreases Pittsburgh quarterbacks experienced in yards per pass attempt and yards per completion were statistically significant ones, a feat unequaled among the other nine wide receivers.

With that sort of production in college, there is no question Baldwin will be able to have success in the NFL by immediately making a passing offense more potent. Also, since Baldwin stands at 6'5", combined with his big-play capabilities, he can keep the team who drafts him from taking the huge gamble of signing Plaxico Burress. Baldwin is a player who can give a team everything Burress could without the baggage and the risk of decline.

Baldwin might not be the first wide receiver drafted, but he certainly deserves to be.

While Baldwin's name is likely to be familiar to those following the NFL draft closely, Robinson's name may not, which is truly a shame since Robinson was the second-most valuable wide receiver out of the 10 I examined, trailing only Baldwin in how much he helped his quarterbacks.

Compared to how SMU quarterbacks performed when Robinson is included in their passing statistics to when he is removed, the quarterbacks underwent a 2.2 percent increase in completion percentage (from 59.2 percent to 60.5 percent), a 9.2 percent decrease in yards per pass attempt (from 7.6 to 6.9), a 10.9 percent decrease in yards per completion (from 12.8 to 11.4), and a 12.9 percent decrease in touchdown percentage (from 6.2 percent to 5.4 percent).

Like Baldwin, Robinson is best at raising a quarterback's yards per completion average and better at it than the other eight wide receivers I looked at, solidifying his place among elite big-play wide receivers since the decrease SMU quarterbacks had in yards per completion was statistically significant.

Although Robinson is not nearly getting the recognition he deserves for his play, the team smart enough to draft him will be more than pleased with his ability to stretch the field vertically.

Both Baldwin and Robinson did not just best their fellow future wide receiver rookies in yards per pass attempt and yards per completion value, but they also had more successful college careers than Mike Wallace did in yards per completion value.

During his time at Ole Miss, when Ole Miss quarterbacks had Wallace's production included in their statistics to when he was removed from them, they experienced a .2 percent decrease in completion percentage (from 51.7 percent to 51.6 percent), a 10.1 percent decrease in yards per pass attempt (from 6.9 to 6.2), a 9.8 percent decrease in yards per completion (from 13.3 to 12.0), and a 11.5 percent decrease in touchdown percentage (from 5.2 percent to 4.6 percent).

As his college statistics show, Wallace was a slightly more complete college wide receiver, owing to the fact he was more valuable to his quarterbacks' completion percentage and yards per pass attempt than were Baldwin and Robinson. However, as purely deep threats, Baldwin and Robinson were superior to Wallace.

Neither wide receiver may run an official 4.33 40-yard dash as Mike Wallace did at the 2009 NFL Combine, but there should be no question about either's speed. It is impossible for someone without above-average speed to average 18.3 yards per catch as both Baldwin and Robinson did over their college careers. Furthermore, SMU head coach June Jones called Robinson the fastest player he ever coached.

When it comes to big-play receiving threats in the 2011 NFL Draft, no NFL team is going to find two more capable wide receivers than Baldwin and Robinson, which is why they should be the first two wide receivers who are drafted. Even though it is unlikely they actually will be, the NFL teams that retain their services will certainly see their passing offenses become more dangerous and potent.

Labels: , , , , , ,